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Abstract 
We present a new form of randomness, called « Deep Randomness », 
generated in such a way that probability distribution of the output signal is 
made unknowledgeable for an observer. By limiting, thanks to Deep 
Randomness, the capacity of the opponent observer to perform Bayesian 
inference over public information to estimate private information, we can 
design protocols, beyond Shannon limit, enabling two legitimate partners, 
sharing originally no common private information, to exchange secret 
information with accuracy as close as desired from perfection, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimitedly powered 
opponent. We discuss the theoretical foundation of Deep Randomness, which 
lies on Prior Probability theory, introduced and developed by authors like 
Laplace, Cox, Carnap, Jefferys and Jaynes ; and we introduce computational 
method to generate such Deep Randomness. 
Key words. Deep Random, Prior Probabilities, Perfect secrecy, advantage distillation, secret key agreement, 
unconditional security, quantum resistant, information theoretic security 
 
Introduction 
Modern cryptography mostly relies on mathematical 
problems commonly trusted as very difficult to solve, 
such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithm, 
belonging to complexity theory. No certainty exist on the 
actual difficulty of those problems. Some other methods, 
rather based on information theory, have been developed 
since early 90’s. Those methods relies on hypothesis 
about the opponent (such as « memory bounded » 
adversary [6]) or about the communication channel (such 
as « independent noisy channels » [5]); unfortunately, if 
their perfect secrecy have been proven under given 
hypothesis, none of those hypothesis are easy to ensure 
in practice. At last, some other methods based on 
physical theories like quantum indetermination [3] or 
chaos generation have been described and experimented, 
but they are complex to implement, and, again, relies on 
solid but not proven and still partly understood theories. 
Considering this theoretically unsatisfying situation, we 
propose to explore a new path, where proven information 
theoretic security can be reached, without assuming any 
limitation about the opponent, who is supposed to have 
unlimited calculation and storage power, nor about the 
communication channel, that is supposed to be perfectly 
public, accessible and equivalent for any playing party 
(legitimate partners and opponents). In our model of 
security, the legitimate partners of the protocol are using 
Deep Random generation to generate their secret 
information, and the behavior of the opponent, when 
inferring from public information, is governed by Deep 
Random assumption, that we introduce. 
Shannon and the need of Bayesian inference 
Shannon, in [1], established his famous impossibility 
result, stating that, in order to obtain perfect secrecy in 
an encryption system, it is needed that the probability of 
the clear message      is equal to the conditional 
probability    |   of the clear message knowing the 
encrypted message. In the case where the encryption 
system is using a secret key   with a public transform 
procedure to transform the clear message in the 
encrypted message, Shannon then comes to the 
conclusion that perfect secrecy can only be obtained if 
          (where   designates Shannon’s entropy). 
It is a common belief in the cryptologic community that, 
in cases where the legitimate partners initially shares no 
secret information (which we can write       ), the 
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result of Shannon thus means that it is impossible for 
them to exchange a perfectly secret bit of information. 
The support for that belief is that, by applying Shannon’s 
method, the absence of key entropy makes the 
conditional expectation  [ | ] to be completely and 
equally known by all the parties (legitimate receiver and 
opponent), as : 
 [ | ]  ∑ 
   |      
∑    |          
 
 
and thus, that the legitimate receiver cannot gain any 
advantage over the opponent when he tries to estimate 
the secret clear message from the public encrypted 
message. This reasoning however supposes that all the 
parties have a full knowledge of the distribution     , 
enabling them to perform the above bayesian inference 
to estimate  from  . 
Shannon himself warned the reader of [1] to that regard, 
but considered that this assumption is fairly 
reasonable (let’s remember that computers were almost 
not yet existing when he wrote his article): 
« There are a number of difficult epistemological 
questions connected with the theory of secrecy, or in fact 
with any theory which involves questions of probability 
(particularly a priori probabilities, Bayes’ theorem, etc.) 
when applied to a physical situation. Treated abstractly, 
probability theory can be put on a rigorous logical basis 
with the modern measure theory approach. As applied to 
a physical situation, however, especially when 
“subjective” probabilities and unrepeatable experiments 
are concerned, there are many questions of logical 
validity. For example, in the approach to secrecy made 
here, a priori probabilities of various keys and messages 
are assumed known by the enemy cryptographer. » 
The model of security that we develop in this article, by 
enabling the legitimate partners to use a specific form of 
randomness where the a priori probabilities of the 
messages cannot be efficiently known by the opponent, 
puts this opponent in a situation where the above 
reasoning based on Bayesian inference no longer stands. 
Prior probabilities theory 
The art of prior probabilities consists in assigning 
probabilities to random event in a context of partial or 
complete uncertainty regarding the probability 
distribution governing that random event. The first 
author who has rigorously considered this question is 
Laplace [10], proposing the famous principle of 
insufficient reason by which, if an observer do not know 
the prior probability of occurrence of 2 events, he should 
consider them as equally likely. In other words, if a 
random variable   can take several values        , and 
if no information regarding the prior probabilities 
        is available for the observer, he should assign 
them           ⁄  in any attempt to produce 
inference from an experiment of  . 
Several authors observed that this principle can lead to 
conclusion contradicting the common sense. They 
proposed some improved principles to assign prior 
probabilities, like the maximum entropy principle 
developed by Good [12] and Jaynes [7], or the    
function of Carnap [11]. The consistency of those 
improved principles with the logical foundation of 
probability theory has been carfully and deeply studied.   
Jaynes, in [7], has proposed a remarkable and resulted 
theory to reduce the difficulties associated to the 
unsifficiently defined Laplace principle. His statement is 
that, when 2 probability distributions are transformed 
from one to the other using a finite or isometric 
transformation group, and if no prior information is 
available to the observer to privilege one or the other 
distribution, then, (i) by symmetry, Laplace’s principle 
can be safely applied within the fundamental domain of 
the group, and (ii) the method matches the maximum 
entropy criteria. We will also use such symmetry 
principle in the construction of our protocol. 
In all the following, we will only consider measurable 
sets, where probability can then be intuitively defined 
over the tribe of all parties of such set. 
Deep random assumption 
We introduce below the Deep Random assumption, that 
is an objective principle to assign prior probabilities, 
compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by 
Jaynes. 
Let   be a random variable with values in a set  , having 
unknown (or hidden) probability distributions for  , 
except a same public characteristical information  . We 
denote    the set of all possible distributions having that 
same public characteristic information  . Let also   be a 
random variable with values in a set  , and whose 
probability distribution is known and depends from a 
parameter in set  , that parameter being typically the 
value of an experiment of  . If there exists a finite or 
isometric transformation group   such that, for each 
transformation    , the distribution       has no a 
priori reason for the opponent   to be more likely than 
        , (this in particular means that    is stable by 
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action of  ) therefore, from the non-subjectivity 
principle, the set of possible joint distributions viewed 
from the opponent, can be restricted to the invariant class 
by action of   : 
   {
 
| |
∑   
   
|     } 
If we consider   as any application from   in an Hilbert 
space  , the conditional expectation  [    | ]  can be 
viewed as the strategy of the opponent   to guess private 
information      from the knowledge of the public 
information  , and the Deep Random assumption then 
states that the conditional expectation  [    | ]  
should be chosen by the opponent within the restricted 
set of strategies : 
 [    | ]        
 {      [    | ]|       }       
      can in other words be written : 
      {     
∫       |        
∫   |        
|       } 
The security model 
We consider Autonomous Entities (AE), which, like in 
every classical protocol modelization, are entities 
capable to Generate random bit strings, Publish bit 
strings on the public channel, Read bit strings published 
by other AE from the public channel, Store bit strings, 
Make calculation on bit strings. The main difference of 
our model is that random generation also includes Deep 
Random generation, a form of randomness in which the 
probability distribution used by an AE is made unknown 
for all other party by the use of a Deep Random 
Generator (DRG), we will see below how such DRG can 
be designed. 
In our model, an observer (or opponent) AE called   is 
supposed to have unlimited calculation and storage 
power, it is also supposed to have full access to the 
information published by the legitimate AE partners on 
the public channel, that is supposed to be perfectly 
accessible and equivalent for any playing party 
(legitimate partners and opponents). The considered 
opponent is passive. 
The specificity of our model is that when   desires to 
infer the secret information generated by partner  ’s 
DRG (or  ’s DRG) from a public information, it can 
only do it in respect of the Deep Random assumption     
presented above. 
This assumption is fairly reasonable, as established by 
the Prior Probability theory presented above, under the 
condition that the DRG can actually produce 
distributions that are undistinguishable and unpredictable 
among the set    of distributions compliant with the 
public characteristic information  . It is also easy to see 
that for any non-objective strategy to assign prior 
probabilities, a better objective strategy exists ; « better » 
being understood under the sense of quadratic 
optimization in the considered Hilbert space, where 
     is evaluated. 
The protocols that we consider here will be further 
modelized in the description below, but at this stage one 
can already say that they obey the Kerckhoffs’s principle 
by the fact that their specifications are entirely public. 
We can thus modelize the usage of such protocol in 2 
phases : 
 Legitimate partners Opponent 
The 
elaboration 
phase 
The specification of 
the protocol are 
made public 
 
(  with below 
notations) 
The opponent elaborate 
its « best » objective 
strategy, being a 
deterministic or 
probabilistic function 
taking as parameters 
the public information 
that are released during 
an instantiation 
 
(       with below 
notations) 
 
The 
instantiation 
phase 
The legitimate 
partners both 
calculate their 
estimation of the 
common secret 
information based 
on their part of the 
secret information 
generated during an 
instantiation plus the 
public information 
that are released 
during the 
instantiation 
 
(        and 
        with below 
notations) 
 
The Opponent 
calculates its 
estimation of the 
common secret 
information as the 
value of the strategy 
function with the 
released public 
information as 
parameters. 
 
(       with below 
notations) 
 
 
Then, when we say that distributions       and 
         are undistinguishable and unpredictable 
among the set    through Deep Randomness, we mean 
that they are undistinguishable and unpredictable among 
the set    through Deep Randomness for the opponent at 
the elaboration phase. 
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Concepts of Perfect Secrecy Protocols (PSP) 
The main purpose of the following is to introduce how to 
design a « Perfect Secrecy Protocol » under Deep 
Random assumption, and to introduce how to generate 
Deep Random from classical computing resources. 
A « Perfect Secrecy Protocol » (PSP)  , is a protocol 
according to the general model presented below,  
 
in which the AE   (resp.    requests its Deep Random 
Generator (DRG) at a given moment to obtain an 
experiment   (resp.  ) of a random variable   (resp.  ) 
with hidden probability distribution ;   (resp.    
publishes the set of information   (resp.    on the public 
channel along the protocol ;   (resp.    calculates its 
estimation of a joined secret information          (resp. 
        , with value in an Hilbert space, and the 
eavesdropping opponent   who has a full access to the 
public information, calculates its own estimation 
              , also called strategy of the opponent. 
In case of PSP, there must exist a finite or isomorphic 
group of transformation   keeping    stable, such that, 
for each transformation    , the joint distribution 
       is, by construction of the Deep Random 
generation process, undistinguishable from           
by the opponent. And therefore, the set of possible joint 
distributions viewed from the opponent, can be restricted 
to the invariant class by action of   : 
   {
 
| |
∑        
   
|     } 
From the Deep Random assumption, the set of optimal 
strategies for the opponent can be restricted to : 
        {        [  |   ]|         } 
The set of all possible such groups   for the considered 
protocol  , is denoted     . 
Then, the protocol   is a PSP if it verifies the following 
property     : 
           |              [‖    ‖
 ]
   [‖     ‖
 ]                                  
In particular, this implies that there exists, for any 
strategy   (even outside of   ) chosen by the opponent, 
a couple of distributions   and    such that, if they are 
used respectively by   and   to generate   and   : 
 [‖    ‖
 ]      [‖     ‖
 ]              
   
  Indeed,     shall in particular be true for an element 
of    corresponding to    ̃  
 
| |
∑             
where   represents the actual joined distribution used by 
the legitimate partners. Then, by considering the 
obvious : 
 [‖    ‖
 ] ̃        [‖     ‖
 ] ̃ 
the inf in the above inequality is reached for an element 
   of        . Thus, from     : 
 [‖    ‖
 ] ̃   [‖ 
    ‖
 ] ̃
   [‖     ‖
 ] ̃ 
The last inequality being also possibly written : 
∫ ‖     ‖
      |     ̃        
 
      
  ∫ ‖  
 
      
   ‖
      |     ̃         
The above implies that there exits       such that : 
∫ ‖     ‖
      |    
 
   
  ∫ ‖     ‖
      |    
 
   
 
Which gives the result for      and     .  
An example of PSP is given in Annex. Its detailed 
presentation, and proof of secrecy under Deep Random 
assumption can be found in [9] Section III. 
In practice, one can obtain the property     typically by 
deriving the information   (resp.  ) published by   (resp. 
 ) from a degradation of a secret information   (resp.  ), 
in a way that the only mean for the opponent to estimate 
say         from the public information {   } is to 
perform a bayesian inference from {   }, which requires 
the knowledge of the probability distribution of  . 
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Degradation can be understood as degradation of the 
accuracy of the signal  . 
Let’s define rigorously what a Degradation is. Let   be a 
random variable with values in a set   and probability 
distribution   ; let also   be be a random variable with 
values in a set   whose probability distribution depends 
on a parameter in set  , and that is drawn after an 
experiment of   giving the input parameter. Let   be a 
Hilbert space, and        be an application called 
« evaluation ». 
 
 
Definition : 
A Degradation in   related to     and   is an 
application       , transforming the output 
of  , and such that, for any applications    
   , verifying  [     | ]      , the 
following strict inequality stands : 
 [‖          ‖
 ]       [‖         ‖
 ] 
In this definition, the notations should be read, due to 
transformation  , as : 
 [     | ]  ∫        |     
 
 
 
 [‖          ‖
 ]
 ∫ ∫‖     
 
 
 
 
     ‖    |            
A Degradation can be seen as a transform that is applied 
on a secret information, in order to reduce the accuracy 
of the derived public information. As an analogy with 
quantum behavior (Heisenberg uncertainty principle), the 
above definition means that, with Degradation, it is 
impossible to infer the private information from the 
public information with equaling both the first and 
second moments. 
Let’s give an example that will be used in the protocol 
that is presented in Annex as a PSP example.   
[   ]  [   ] ,    , and   is a pair of Bernoulli 
vector random variables       with values in {   }  
{   } , and whose parameter vectors are in   and 
coming from an expriment of  . The Degradation is 
given, for any                             
 , by : 
          ((
  
 
   
  
 
)  (
  
 
   
  
 
)) 
where    . The application   is chosen as : 
       
   
 
 
(where     designates the scalar product of   and  ). It 
is easy to show (you can easily verify by yourself) 
that the only possible applications    is : 
         
 
   
 
 
and that : 
 [(  
   
 
 
   
 
)
 
]               [(     
   
 
)
 
] 
Which means that   is a Degradation for   sufficiently 
large. 
Deep random generation 
It is of course of great importance to be able to 
concretely produce some Deep Random if we want to 
use it for practical applications like cryptography. A 
Deep Random Generator (DRG) must be able to produce 
a random signal for which a large diversity of 
distributions could be considered as equally likely for the 
observer. By using an objective method for assigning 
prior probabilities, the observer has to choose a strategy 
prior to the release of the public information. This 
strategy is an application      , where   is the set 
of possible values for the public information, and   is 
the Hilbert space in which the joined secret information 
is projected. And by doing so, the DRG should then 
ensure that any set of possible distributions {       } 
should remain indistinguishable by any such prior 
strategy. This enables us to give a definition for the 
concept of indistinguishable distributions (with the same 
notations than previously) : 
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Definition 2 : 
A set of distributions {       } is said made of 
  undistinguishable  distributions (   ) 
relatively to   and      if : 
    
 
 
∑∫‖         ‖    |         
 
  
 
 
∑     |  ∫‖     
 
     ‖    |          
Let’s explain the relevance of this definition. If the 
distributions were not undistinguishable relatively to   
and     , there would exist a strategy   enabling the 
observer to determine from an experiment of   what 
distribution among {       } is the most likely to be 
used, with the same level of accuracy to estimate      
than with having knowledge of which    is actually 
used. And from there, the observer could do a classical 
bayesian inference of       with the determined   , 
which would contradict the inequality above. 
It may appear impossible at first sight to generate an 
unknowledgeable probability distribution from a 
deterministic computing resource. In fact it is not. The 
basic idea is to use infinite incrementing counters as 
primary source of entropy, and then to run across those 
counters one or several Cantor’ style diagonal recursive 
constructing process, in which at each step    , the 
generator picks (through classical randomness) a new 
distribution that defeats the best possible strategy 
knowing all the past distributions for    . Such a 
DRG, based on continuous and recursive constructing 
process, can only be designed in association with a given 
PSP. At each step   , the generator emulates the PSP 
internally and picks (through classical randomness) a 
new couple of distributions that defeats the best possible 
strategy knowing all the past distributions for    , 
which is always possible for a PSP as as per property 
     shown above. The source of secret entropy is the 
current values of the inifinite counters (several can run in 
parallel) of the continuous recursive process, together 
with the classical random that is used at each step to pick 
a defeating distribution. Such entropy must of course be 
at least equal to the length of the message to send to 
obtain perfect secrecy. 
A detailed presentation of a DRG using a recursive 
method as introduced above, associated with the example 
of PSP, can be found in [9] Section IV. 
 
Conclusion 
We have introduced a new idea to design secure 
communication protocol able to reach perfect secrecy. 
The obtained result, apparently contradicting Shannon’s 
pessimistic theorem, is possible thanks to the nature of 
Deep Random that prevents the use of Bayesian 
inference from public information, because not only 
draws but also probability distributions themselves are 
unknown to the opponent. In this work, our main 
objective was to expose this new idea and to present a 
working protocol (Annex). But of course, once done, the 
next question is : if such protocol exist, what is the best 
one ? In cryptology and communication sciences, there 
exist many criteria of quality for a protocol. One of the 
most critical one for practical implementation is the 
burden of exchanged data needed to obtain a secure digit 
(or plain text) of information. The question then roughly 
becomes: given        (introduced as error rate and 
opponent knowledge rate in Annex), what is, under Deep 
Random assumption, a protocol exchanging the minimal 
quantity to obtain the above upper-bounds ? 
We introduce this more general question in [9], and we 
hope this challenge will create enthusiasm for the largest 
possible number of curious minds interested in 
cryptology, information theory and communication 
sciences. 
References 
[1] C. E. Shannon, « Communication theory of 
secrecy systems », Bell Syst. Tech. J., Vol. 28, pp. 
656-715, Oct. 1949 
[2] A. N. Kolmogorov, « On Tables of Random 
Numbers », Sankhya. Indian Journal of Statistics 
A, 25(4) :369-376 
[3] C. H. Bennet and G. Brassard, « Quantum 
cryptography and its application to provable 
secure key expansion, public-key distribution and 
coin-tossing », Proc. IEEE International 
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal 
Processing, Bangalore, India, pp. 175-179, Dec. 
1984 
[4] C. H. Bennet, G. Brassard and J.-M. Robert, 
« Privacy Amplification by Public Discussion », 
SIAM J. COMPUT., Vol. 17, No. 2, Apr. 1988 
[5] U. M. Maurer, « Secret Key Agreement by Public 
Discussion from Common Information », IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 39, No. 
3, May 1993 
- 7- 
[6] C. Cachin and U. M. Maurer, « Unconditional 
Security Against Memory-Bounded 
Adversaries », Proceeding of CRYPTO ’97, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 
1997 
[7] E. T. Jaynes, « Prior Probabilities », IEEE 
Transactions On Systems Science and 
Cybernetics, vol. sec-4, no. 3, 1968, pp. 227-241 
[8] R. T. Cox, « Probability, frequency and 
reasonable expectation », American Journal of 
Physics 17 (1946) 1-13 
[9] T. de Valroger, « Perfect Secrecy under Deep 
Random assumption », Arxiv.org 
(http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.08258 full version) 
[10] P. S. de Laplace, « A philosophical essay on 
Probabilities », Paris 1814 
[11] R. Carnap, « The Continuum of Inductive 
Methods », University of Chicago Press, 1952 
[12] I. J. Good, « Maximum entropy for hypothesis 
formulation », Ann. Math. Statist., 34, pp. 911-
930, 1963 
 
Who is the author ? 
I have been an engineer in computer science for 20 years. 
My professional activities in private sector are related to 
IT Security and digital trust, but have no relation with 
my personal research activity in the domain of 
cryptology. If you are interested in the topics introduced 
in this article, please feel free to establish first contact at 
tdevalroger@gmail.com   
 
  
- 8- 
Annex: example of a Perfect Secrecy Protocol. 
In this Annex we present an example of PSP, based on 
Bernouilli random variables. The detailed presentation 
and the proof of secrecy under Deep Random assumption 
can be found in [9]. 
For this example, besides being hidden to the opponent, 
the probability distribution used by each legitimate 
partner also needs to have specific properties in order to 
prevent the opponent to evaluate    with the same 
accuracy than the legitimate partners by using symmetry 
and independence in the choice of their distributions by 
the legitimate partners. 
Those specific properties are : 
(i) Each probability distribution   (of   and  ) must be 
« far » from its symmetric projection  ̅    
 
  
∑               (where      represents 
               ) 
(ii) At least one of the distribution (of   or  ) must avoid 
to have brutal variations (Dirac) 
The technical details explaining those constraints are 
presented in [9]. The set of compliant distributions is 
denoted      where   is a parameter that measures the 
« remoteness » of a distribution from its symmetric 
projection. 
For such a distribution  , a tidying permutation, denoted 
  , is a specific permutation that enables to give a 
canonical form      of  , such form being useful to 
synchronize two distributions by transitivity. Again, 
technical details are given in [9]. 
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol : 
  and   are two AE, called the legitimate partners. The 
steps of the protocol          are the followings : 
Step 1 – Deep Random Generation :   and   pick 
independantly the respective probability distributions   
and       , so that  (resp.   ) is secret (under Deep 
Random assumption) for any observer other than   
(resp.  ) beholding all the published information.   
draws the parameter vector   [   ]  from  .   draws 
the parameter vector   [   ]  from  . 
Step 2 – Degradation :   generates a Bernouilli 
experiment vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector  
 
 
.   publishes  .   generates a Bernouilli experiment 
vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector  
 
 
.   
publishes  . 
Step 3 – Dispersion :   and   also pick respectively a 
second probability distribution   and         such 
that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) 
for any observer other than   (resp.  ).   is selected 
also such that ∫       
 
| | [ | | √   | | √ ]
 
 
 √ 
 in order 
to ensure that | | is not an unlikely value for  |
 
 
| (same 
for   by replacing   by   and   by  ).    (resp.   ) is 
used to scramble the publication of the tidying 
permutation of   (resp.  ).   (resp.  ) calculates a 
permutation   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) representing the reverse 
of the most likely tidying permutation on   (resp.   ) to 
produce   (resp.  ). In other words, with  ,   [ ] 
realizes : 
   
    
∫   |        
       
 
 
 
Then   (resp.  ) draws a boolean   {   } (resp.   ) 
and publishes in a random order         
     [ ]    , (resp.            
      [ ]     ) where 
  represents the transposition of elements in a couple. 
Step 4 – Synchronization :   (resp.  ) chooses randomly 
   (resp.   )  among           (resp.        ). 
Step 5 – Decorrelation:   computes    
  
       
     
 
, 
  computes    
  
      
  
     
 
.    and    are then 
transformed respectively by   and   in binary output 
thanks to a sampling method described hereafter. At this 
stage the protocol can then be seen as a broadcast model 
with 2 Binary Symmetric Channels (BSC), one between   
and   and one between   and   who computes a certain 
  , called  ’s strategy, that is to be transformed in 
binary output by the same sampling method than for   
and  . It is shown in Theorem 1 that those 2 BSC are 
partially independent, which enable to create Advantage 
Distillation as shown in [5]. 
Step 5’ – Advantage Distillation : by applying error 
correcting techniques with code words of length   
between   and  , as introduced in [5], we show in 
Theorem 1 that we can then create advantage for   
compared to   in the binary flows resulting from the 
error correcting code. 
Step 6 : classical Information Reconciliation and Privacy 
Amplification (IRPA) techniques then lead to get 
accuracy as close as desired from perfection between 
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estimations of legitimate partners, and knowledge as 
close as desired from zero by any unlimitedly powered 
opponent, as shown in [4]. 
The choice of the parameters           are set to make 
steps 5, 5’ and 6 possible, details are given in [9]. 
The Degradation transformations   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 with 
    at step 2 are the ones that prevent the use of direct 
inference by the opponent, and of course, the Deep 
Random Generation at step 1 prevents the use of 
Bayesian inference based on the knowledge of the 
probability distribution. The synchronization step 4 is 
designed to overcome the independence between the 
choices of the distributions of   and  , and needs that 
the distributions to have special properties (       in 
order to efficiently play their role. It is efficient in   ⁄  of 
cases (when   picks       and   picks       , 
which we will call favorable cases). And to prevent   
from gaining knowledge of   , Dispersion step 3 mixes 
   within         with another permutation   [ ] (and 
    within           with another permutation    [ ]) 
that (1) is undistinguishable from    knowing  , and (2) 
manages to make the estimation of   unefficient as 
shown in [9]. We denote the following set of strategies 
(invariant by transposition of         or ( 
 
   
 
 )): 
  
  {                
 
   
 
   |    
 
 {   }  (               
  (     
 
 ))
                 
 
   
 
   } 
Because of Deep Random assumption     over the group 
{    } applied to the distribution of         and 
         , the strategy of the opponent can thus be 
restricted to      
 . 
  is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which 
explains the constraint and transformation applied on   
in step 3 to make    and   [ ] indisguishable knowing   
(same with    [ ],    , and  ). 
The synchronization step has a cost when considering the 
favorable cases:   knows that   and    are synchronized 
in favorable cases, which means in other words that   
knows that an optimal (or quasi optimal) permutation is 
applied to   . This also means that in favorable cases, all 
happen like if when   picks     instead of  , the 
result of the synchronization is that   uses      instead 
of   . Starting from the most general strategy     
  for 
 , we will also consider in the proof of main Theorem 
the following additional restrictions applicable to the 
favorable cases: 
 Restriction to the strategies of the form       , 
because    [ ]    [ ]  depends only on       
and not on   neither   , 
 And then restriction to the set of strategies such 
that                     , in other words 
strategies invariant by common permutation on 
   . 
which leads to define the more restricted set of strategies: 
        {  [   ]
   |                          
                            } 
Regarding the legitimate partners, when   picks 
      and   picks       , the choice of    and    
remain independant from    , so that   and   remain 
draws of independant Bernouilli random variables, then 
allowing to apply Chernoff-style bounds for the 
legitimate partners. When   picks      [ ] or   picks 
      [ ], this is no longer true and    or    become 
erratic, which will lead to error detection by error 
correcting code at step 5’. 
The heuristic table analysis of the protocol is then the 
following: 
 
  picks       
among         
  picks    
  [ ] among 
        
  picks 
       
among 
          
  and   respective 
estimations are close in 
~100% of cases, and 
thus both obtain 
accurate estimation of 
the combined shared 
secret in ~100% of 
cases. 
 
  cannot make accurate 
estimation of the 
combined shared secret 
in at least ~25% of 
cases (if   tries to have 
a strategy depending on 
               , then 
   [ ]    [ ]  is 
indistinguishable from 
         and is thus 
picked by   in 25% of 
cases. 
  and   respective 
estimations are not 
close which leads 
to error detection 
and finally 
discarding. 
  picks 
      [ ] 
among 
          
  and   respective 
estimations are not 
close which leads to 
error detection and 
finally discarding. 
  and   respective 
estimations are not 
close which leads 
to error detection 
and finally 
discarding. 
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This is a heuristic reasoning, and we must rather consider 
most general strategies                      and write 
the probability equations with the appropriate group 
transform, under Deep Random assumption. But this 
little array explains why we create partial independence 
between the BSC and consequently then an advantage 
for the legitimate partners compared to the opponent, 
bearing in mind that         (resp.          ) are 
absolutely undistinguishable knowing   (resp.  ), due to 
the fact that the distributions   and   (resp.    and   ) 
are unknown and thus also absolutely undistinguishable 
by  . 
 
